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"It may be said that the difference is only one of degree. Most
differences are, when nicely analyzed." - Oliver Wendell Holmes
3
As I learned on a recent visit to Porto Alegre, when a Brazilian has a
problem he'll say, "tenho um abacaxi para resolver" - "I have a
pineapple to resolve." It's a charming idiom; but, sadly, the problem on
my mind today isn't just prickly, but also hugely messy-it's a big,
tangled knot of questions, not nearly as compact as a pineapple. How did
it come about-given that Daubert describes the old Frye Rule as
"austere," and the new regime introduced with Federal Rule of Evidence
[FRE] 702 as more flexible, more favorable to the admission of expert
testimony4 -that, at least in civil cases, the effect of Daubert seems to
have been to make the admission of expert testimony more difficult,
rather than less, and even to shift admissibility closer to sufficiency? Is
there something about the character of relevance and reliability, the key
concepts of Daubert, that explains this development? How did these two
concepts get built into Daubert to begin with? Are these post-Daubert
1. I. Goodman Cohen lecture, Wayne Law School, October 2015. © 2015 Susan
Haack.
2. Distinguished Professor in the Humanities, Cooper Senior Scholar in Arts and
Sciences, Professor of Philosophy, and Professor of Law at the University of Miami.
B.A., M.A., B.Phil., Oxford; Ph.D., Cambridge. Professor Haack's most recent books are
EVIDENCE MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF AND TRUTH IN THE LAW (2014), PERsPECTIVAS
PRAGMATISTAS DA FILOSOFIA DO DEREITO (2015), and LEGALIZZARE L'EPISTEMOLOGIA
(2015).
3. Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (Mass. 1889) (Holmes, J. majority opinion).
The distinction at issue in this case was the permissible height of boundary fences; but
Holmes's point is of course quite general.
4. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993) ("Daubert I").
653
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
developments to be welcomed? Or are they not only unintended but also
undesirable consequences of a potentially dangerous fault line?
How do you resolve a pineapple? I suppose, the same way you eat an
elephant--one bite at a time! And how do you disentangle a big, messy
knot of questions? Well, the only way I know is patiently to tug out one
strand at a time. So I'll start by sketching enough of the pre-history of
Daubert to suggest how the concepts of relevance and reliability came to
play their central role (§1). Then I'll explore some complexities of these
concepts, most importantly their gradational character (§2). Next, I'll
argue that the mismatch between the gradational concepts of relevance
and reliability and the categorical concept of admissibility presents
courts with a problem about the degree of relevance and degree of
reliability to require; and show by means of a sampling of rulings on
Daubert issues that, while some courts have maintained a clear
distinction, others have set the bar of relevance and/or of reliability so
high as to blur the line between admissibility and sufficiency (§3). And
finally, tugging at the normative strands in my knot of problems, I'll try
to explain why I find this elision of admissibility into sufficiency
disturbing (§4).
1. HISTORICAL PRELIMINARIES
Of course, the concept of relevance is hardly new to legal thinking. It
figures prominently, for example, in two famous volumes on evidence
law published long before Daubert: James Thayer's celebrated
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, published in
1898,5 and Dean McCormick's influential textbook, Handbook of the
Law of Evidence, published in 1954.6
An entry for "relevancy" in the index of Thayer's treatise takes you
to a substantial chunk of text. Relevancy, Thayer tells us, is a
"fundamental conception," since a presupposition of any rational system
of legal fproof is that evidence which is not relevant should not be
admitted. That relevant evidence should be admitted, he goes on, is also
a fundamental principle; but this time subject to many qualifications and
exceptions because, over the course of its history, our legal system has
5. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELuAINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW (1898).
6. CHARLES T. McCOPMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1954).
7. THAYER, supra note 5, at 264-65.
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constructed an elaborate set of rules excluding certain kinds of relevant
evidence, along with various exceptions to those rules.
8
An entry for "relevancy" in the index of McCormick's textbook
takes you to an entire chapter on the subject. Citing Thayer at some
length, McCormick endorses his two "fundamental principles," which he
summarizes like this: "the first ground of exclusion should be want of
probative value"; and, "if evidence is logically probative, it should be
received unless there is some distinct ground for refusing to hear it."9 He
then proposes an understanding of relevancy as "the tendency of the
evidence to establish a material proposition" for which it is offered;1° and
cashes out this "tendency" in terms of the evidence's raising the
probability of the truth of the proposition concerned and this, in turn, as
its raising the chances that the proposition is true." He also explains
what he takes to be the chief grounds that would justify the exclusion of
relevant evidence-as the subtitle of his chapter says: "Time, Prejudice,
Confusion, and Surprise."
12
There is no index entry for "reliability," however, in either book.
True, Thayer's treatise includes a substantial chapter on the so-called
"Best Evidence" principle, 13 which presumably has something to do with
reliability. But, after tracing its long history and its many supposed
applications, Thayer argues that the Best Evidence idea should be
understood, not as a precise legal rule, but as "a large moral principle": 4
"that always, morally speaking, the fact that any given way of proof is all
that a man has, must be a strong reason for receiving it. . . ," and that a
party's not producing the best evidence it could "afford[s] strong ground
of suspicion."'15 McCormick's book also includes a brief section on the
Best Evidence principle,' 6 citing Thayer; 17 but this serves merely as the
introduction to a long discussion of the ramifications of the "original
8. Id. at 265-66. (It strikes me that there is something more than a little odd about
acknowledging that the admissibility of relevant evidence is a "fundamental principle,"
and then suggesting that this principle needs hedging to accommodate the mesh of
exclusionary rules our legal system has happened to arrive at. But I can't pursue that
thought here.)
9. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 314.
10. Id.at 315-16.
11. Id. at 317-18. This explanation in terms of chances makes it clear that
McCormick is taking degrees of proof to be mathematical probabilities.
12. Id. at 314 (subtitle), 315-21 (text).
13. THAYER, supra note 5, at 484-507.
14. Id. at 505.
15. Id. at 507.
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 408-09.
17. Id. at 408.
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document" rule.'8 McCormick doesn't mention, however, that Thayer
had resisted the idea that this, or any, specific rule is an application of
that more general principle.
Most immediately to the present purpose is McCormick's chapter on
"Experimental and Scientific Evidence,"' 19 in which he contrasts Frye v.
United States (1923)2" with McKay v. State (1950).21 He describes Frye
simply as the first case in which a court faced the question of the
admissibility of lie-detector evidence; and McKay as the first case in
which a court faced the question of the admissibility of the results of the
Harger breath test.2 2 And he emphatically endorses the approach taken in
McKay-where the court had ruled that the objection that this expert
testimony was not generally accepted went to its weight, not its
admissibility23-- over the approach taken in Frye. The "general scientific
acceptance" test proposed in Frye as a mark of sufficient "accuracy"
(apparently, reliability) to warrant the admission of novel scientific
testimony, McCormick avers, is misconceived; this is "a proper
condition upon the court's taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but
not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence." 24 In short,
McCormick's position is that the admissibility of expert testimony
should require only relevancy, not reliability.
In 1954, when McCormick's text was first published, Frye had been
cited in only a relatively few rulings-and usually, as McCormick's brief
description suggests, as a precedent for excluding lie-detector evidence.
25
By 1975, however, when the Federal Rules of Evidence were ratified, the
Frye "general acceptance" test had been adopted in many jurisdictions
across the country,26 by this time as a rule governing the admissibility of
18. Id. at 409-25.
19. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 359-83.
20. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923).
21. McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. App. 416, 235 S.W.2d 173 (1950).
22. The phrase refers to an early precursor of the modem breathalyzer, a roadside
breath-testing machine, the "drunkometer," invented by Rolla Neil Harger in 1931.
Douglas Martin, Obituary, Rolla N. Harger Dies. Invented Drunkometer, N.Y. TtMES,
Aug. 10, 1983, at B6.
23. McKay, 235 S.W.2d at 175.
24. McCoMWC, supra note 6, at 363 (emphasis added).
25. Id. (discussing lie-detector tests); see David L. Faigman, Elise Porter & Michael
J. Saks, Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past,
Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1808 n.25 (Apr. 1994) (explaining that "Frye was not cited by a
single other court, federal or state, for a decade. During the first quarter century after its
publication, Frye was cited in eight federal cases and five state cases.").
26. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1228-29 (1980); Faigman, Porter
& Saks, supra note 25, at 1808 n.25 (clarifying that "[d]uring its second quarter century,
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novel scientific testimony generally. But FRE 702-which set the federal
standard of admissibility for all expert testimony, including all scientific
testimony, whether new or not-made no reference either to Frye or to
general acceptance. It read, simply:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
27of an opinion or otherwise.
Had FRE 702 superseded Frye? Courts, and legal scholars, were
divided: some took the new Rule to reject Frye and endorse a pure
relevancy approach like McCormick's; others thought that, like Frye,
Rule 702 implicitly required some indication of reliability.28 In 1985,
when Judge Becker wrote his ruling in U.S. v. Downing,29 this
controversy remained unresolved.
Mr. Downing had been convicted, solely on the basis of eyewitness
testimony that he was the perpetrator, of wire fraud and interstate
transportation of stolen property. 30 The legal issue on appeal was whether
the district court had erred in excluding the expert in the psychology of
perception and memory whom the defense wanted to introduce to testify
as to potential flaws of the eyewitness testimony in the case. 31 Ruling
that this had been a legal error, Judge Becker vacated Downing's
conviction and remanded the case for an in limine hearing on the
admissibility of the proffered psychological evidence. Given that no
fewer than twelve eyewitnesses, some of whom had talked with him for
as long as forty-five minutes-and not in stressful circumstances, but in
the course of routine business dealings-had testified that it was indeed
Downing who had passed himself off as the Rev. Claymore and as
[Frye] was cited fifty-four times in federal cases and twenty-nine times in state cases. By
the 1980s, it was being cited as much each year as it had been in its first fifty years added
together. What seems apparent from counting case citations is that judicial interest in the
Frye test did not pick up until a few years before the promulgation of the Federal Rules
of Evidence and thereafter, no doubt stimulated by the drafting and adoption of the
Federal Rules themselves.").
27. FED. R. EviD. 702 (1975) (amended 2011).
28. The controversies are described in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,
1232-33 (1985); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 n.5 (1993)
("Daubert I").
29. Downing, 753 F.2d. at 1224.
30. Id. at 1226-27.
31. Id. at 1226.
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representing the Universal League of Clergy,32 you might be excused for
feeling, as Judge Dumbauld suggests in his concurrence, that Judge
Becker's substantial, closely-argued ruling is something of a
sledgehammer to crack a nut;33 nonetheless, it is, in Judge Dumbauld's
picturesque phrase, "a minor magnum opus of jurisprudential
virtuosity. 34
Noting approvingly that some courts had recently admitted such
expert psychological testimony under what has become known as the
"helpfulness" provision of FRE 702,35 observing there are numerous
problems with the Frye test,36 that it was doubtful whether Frye survived
under the more liberal standard of FRE 702,37 and that other courts had
"focused on reliability as a critical element of admissibility, 38 Judge
Becker proposes that, when determining the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence, judges should consider:
(1) the soundness and reliability of the process or technique used
in generating the evidence;
(2) the possibility that admitting the evidence would overwhelm,
confuse, or mislead the jury; and
32. Id. at 1226-27.
33. In fact, given that he comments that the circumstances in which the eyewitnesses
met with "Rev. Claymore" weren't of the kind in which the expert would testify that
mistakes are common-there was neither stress nor cross-racial identification involved-
Judge Becker himself seems to anticipate that the proffered expert evidence might in due
course be ruled inadmissible on these grounds. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242.
34. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1244 (Dumbauld, J. concurring). One has to wonder
whether Judge Dumbauld was aware how marvelously oxymoronic this backhanded
compliment is, or how much it sounds like a line from one of W. S. Gilbert's libretti!
35. Id. at 1230-31. Recall that, as it read in 1975, FED. R. EVIn. 702 spoke of expert
testimony that will "assist" the finder of fact. Now (2015) it says "help."
36. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1235-37. Frye is both vague and conservative, Judge
Becker argues; moreover, it may exclude reliable evidence that is not yet generally
accepted.
37. "[T]he Rule 702 standard usually favors admissibility . I.." Id  at 1229.
38. Id. at 1238 (citing State v. Temple, 273 S.E.2d 273, 280 (1981); State v. Kersting,
623 P.2d 1095, 1101 (1981); D'Arc v. D'Arc, 385 A.2d 278 (1978) (providing examples
that suggest that scientific methods not yet generally accepted may be admitted if they are
shown to be reliable); and United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir. 1975)
as an example of a court suggesting that "general acceptance" is "nearly synonymous
with reliability).
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(3) the proffered connection between the scientific research or
test result to be presented, and particular disputed factual issues
in the case.39
Spelling out the first clause, Judge Becker includes a substantial
paragraph suggesting how a court might go about determining the
"soundness and reliability" of novel scientific testimony, listing factors
that might appropriately be considered in the "flexible" inquiry he
believes is needed.40 Degree of acceptance in the relevant community
might still be considered, he writes;4' but where scientific testimony has
no such established track record, courts might look to the relation of the
theory or technique to more established kinds of scientific analysis; 42 to
the existence of a specialized literature; 43 to whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to scientific scrutiny; 4 and, if known, to its
error rate.45
The second clause of Judge Becker's three-part test simply echoes
FRE 403, excluding relevant evidence if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger that it will waste time, or confuse or mislead
the jury.46 His other two clauses, however, are less familiar-or at least,
in 1985 they were less familiar. The third amplifies the requirement that
admissible evidence be relevant to factual issues in the case, as it applies
to scientific testimony specifically; and the first represents a decisive step
away from the pure relevancy approach favored by McCormick and
others. Nearly a decade later, both of these ideas will be found in
Daubert.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals47 was in most respects a
routine Bendectin case, indistinguishable from the many other cases
alleging that this morning-sickness drug caused birth defects in the
children born to women who took it.48 So why did the Supreme Court
grant certiorari?-Because, in ruling the plaintiffs' expert testimony
inadmissible, the district court in Daubert had relied on the "general
39. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
40. Id. (citing 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §702[03], 702-
19(1981)).
41. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1239.
45. Id.
46. FED. R. EWD. 403 (1975) (amended 2011).
47. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) ("Daubert I").
48. See generally MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE
CHALLENGES OF MASS TORTS SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS,
BENDECrUN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION passim (1998).
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acceptance" test and, in affirming this exclusion, the court of appeals had
specifically cited Frye49-which, however, had up till then been used in
criminal trials rather than in civil cases. s0 This provided the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to settle once and for all whether Frye had, or
hadn't, been superseded with the passage of FRE 702. "We granted
certiorari [in Daubert] in light of sharp divisions among the courts
regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony.'
Reading Justice Blackmun's ruling in Daubert, I for one-and,
judging by a comment in his ruling in Paoli,52 Judge Becker for
another-have a distinct sense of dij& vu. The Frye Rule had been
superseded, the Daubert Court ruled; 53 and FRE 702 was more
hospitable to the admission of expert scientific testimony than Frye.54
But this didn't mean that the FRE abrogated courts' gatekeeping
responsibility. 5 On the contrary, Justice Blackmun argued (as Judge
Becker had done), FRE 702 required that courts screen proffered expert
testimony both for its "fit" to the factual issues in the case, and for its
reliability. "[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable. 56 (In this context, citing the Advisory Committee Notes on
FRE 602, Justice Blackmun refers to the common law's insistence on
"'the most reliable sources of information."' 57 Ironically, the Advisory
Committee was quoting McCormick on "best evidence" 5 8-but hadn't
mentioned that he had emphatically rejected the idea that reliability
should be required for expert testimony to be admissible.)
Again like Judge Becker, Justice Blackmun finds both of these
requirements, relevance and reliability, implicit in the "helpfulness"
clause of FRE 702. As he amplifies the relevancy requirement, he
49. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (1989); Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1991).
50. But, I should add, not quite exclusively so. See Barrel of Fun v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.1984); Christopherson v. Allied Signal Corp., 902 F.2d
362 (5th Cir.1990), superseded by 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1990), and cert. denied, 503
U.S. 912 (1992). See also Kenneth J. Cheseboro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk
Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1637 (1993).
51. Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 585 (citations omitted).
52. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 (3rd Cir. 1994) (noting the
similarity between Daubert's list of indicia of reliability, and Judge Becker's own in
Downing).
53. Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 589.
54. Id. at 588-89, and n.6.
55. Id. at 589.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 592 (citing FED. R. EViD. 602 advisory committee's note on FED. R. EVlD.
602, 28 U.S.C. App., p.7 55).
58. MCCoR.ICK, supra note 6, at 19.
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borrows Judge Becker's word, "fit," and quotes his explanation;5 9 and,
after articulating the reliability requirement, again like Judge Becker, he
goes on to suggest how judges might go about assessing the reliability of
proffered expert testimony. Here, however, Justice Blackmun begins
with an idea not found in Downing: the subject of an expert's testimony
must be "scientific . . .knowledge," he writes; and this "establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability." 60 "Knowledge," he continues,
"connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation"; and
"scientific" "implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of
science.",61 Hence his insistence that the focus be on a proffered expert's
methodology, rather than his conclusions; 62 and hence, also, his first
indicium of reliability (can it be and has it been tested?), which relies on
a quasi-Popperian misconception of the supposed "scientific method.
6 3
But the other factors on Justice Blackmun's flexible list-peer review
and publication, known or potential error rate, widespread acceptance in
the relevant community 64-are very reminiscent of Judge Becker's
recommendation that, unless a theory has a track record of acceptance,
judges should ask whether it has been subjected to scientific scrutiny,
whether there is an established scientific literature on the subject, and
what the error rate of a scientific technique might be.65
So the Supreme Court ruled that Frye was superseded; 66 and then
imposed a requirement that expert testimony be not only relevant and
"fit" the facts at issue, but also reliable. Given that reliability first entered
the picture as a criterion for admissibility, rather than as a factor going to
weight, in Frye, this is more than a little ironic. And this is only one of
many ironies in Daubert: among which I would also include the vain
hope that Karl Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science-which
amounts, in the end, to nothing but a thinly-disguised form of
59. In the context of his discussion of the "fit" requirement, Justice Blackmun refers
specifically to Downing. Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 591-92.
60. Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 589-90 n.8. The adjective "evidentiary" signals that this is
a new, legal concept, not quite to be identified with the ordinary sense of "reliable." The
ellipses signal that Justice Blackmun has quietly dropped "technical, or other specialized"
from the text of FRE 702. FED. R. EviD. 702.
61. Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 590.
62. Id. at 595.
63. Id. at 593; see also Susan Haack, Trial and Error, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S66
(2005), reprinted in EVIDENCE MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 104
(2014); Susan Haack, Federal Philosophy of Science: A Deconstruction-And a
Reconstruction, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 394 (2010), reprinted in EVIDENCE MATTERS:
SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 122 (2014).
64. Daubertl, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
65. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
66. Daubertl, 509 U.S. at 589.
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skepticism67 -might serve as a criterion of the reliability of scientific
testimony;68 and the suggestion that peer-reviewed publication is another
indicator of reliability 9 -when much of the substantial body of peer-
reviewed literature indicating that Bendectin was not teratogenic seems,
if Judge Bernstein's ruling in Blum v. Merrell Dow (1996) is to be
believed,70 to have been based on work conducted by scientists
employed, or supported, by Merrell Dow, and some of which seems to
have been seriously flawed.7' Most to the present purpose, though, is the
startling mismatch between the plain statement that Frye is an "austere
standard," now superseded by the new, more liberal FRE 702,72 and the
imposition of what has often turned out to be significantly more rigorous
judicial screening of expert testimony than before.
Merrell Dow had suggested that abandoning Frye would result in "a
'free-for-all' in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and
irrational pseudoscientific assertions" ;73 but Justice Blackmun reassured
them: the adversary system provides sufficient protection against this
danger. "[Clross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and...
instruction on the burden of proof," he wrote, are "the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. 74
Presumably, the reason he took the new standard he articulated in
Daubert to be more liberal than the old Frye Rule was that general
acceptance was no longer required-scientific ideas that were not yet
generally accepted could nonetheless be admitted if other Daubert
factors were satisfied.75 It seems safe to say, however, that in practice, at
67. See SUSAN HAACK, Just Say "No" to Logical Negativism (2011), in PUrING
PHILOSOPHY TO WORK: INQUIRY AND ITS PLACE IN CULTURE 179 (2008; 2nd ed. 2013);
Federal Philosophy of Science, supra note 63.
68. Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 593.
69. Id.
70. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 33 Phila. Cnty. Rep. 193, 230 (1996).
71. For more details, see infra note 88 and accompanying text; Susan Haack, Peer
Review and Publication: Lessons for Lawyers, 36 STETSON L. REv. 789 (2007), reprinted
in EVIDENCE MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 156 (2014).
72. Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 589.
73. Id. at 595-96.
74. Id. at 596. Of course, as we have seen (and as Merrell Dow must surely have
known) it wasn't true that, until Daubert, Frye had kept "junk science" out of civil cases;
it had almost always been confined to criminal cases.
75. Of course, Daubert applied only to federal courts; and when the Florida Supreme
Court decided that Florida should not adopt Daubert, but stick with Frye, it took pride in
maintaining its (supposedly) more rigorous regime. "Despite the federal adoption of a
more lenient standard ... we [Florida] have maintained the higher standard of reliability
as dictated by Frye." Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d. 268, 271-72 (1997). The present situation
in Florida is far from clear. Under the Florida constitution, procedural changes are the
province, not of the legislature, but of the Florida Supreme Court. FLA. CONST. art. 5 §2.
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least in civil cases, Daubert has proven much more demanding than,
apparently,76 Justice Blackmun anticipated.
In part, this is because-given that it interprets FRE 702, which
applies to all expert testimony, scientific or not, novel or not-Daubert
is much broader in scope than Frye, which applies only to novel
scientific testimony. In part, also, it's because, if a party is obliged to
show that its expert testimony passes muster under all the Daubert
factors, it could face a significantly harder task under Daubert than it
would have under Frye. But in significant part, too, as I shall argue, it is
due to certain key complexities of those central Daubert concepts,
relevance and reliability-to the potential for conceptual slippage that I
described as a "fault line" in Daubert.
2. CONCEPTUAL COMPLEXITIES
Relevance is a two-place relation-a relation between some
proposition, claim, evidence, testimony, consideration, point, fact, etc.,
However, in 2013 the Florida legislature voted to adopt Daubert. 2013 FLA. LAWS 107,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.702 & 90.704 (West 2014). Then, in Hernandez v. State, the
Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged that this move to Daubert was intended "to
tighten the rules for admissibility of any expert opinion"; but did not unambiguously
endorse the change. Hernandez v. State, 2015 WL 5445655, at *24 (Sept. 17, 2015).
Granted, the ruling continues, in Daubert the U.S. Supreme Court had criticized Frye as
too restrictive; nonetheless, even under Daubert general acceptance in the relevant
community remains one factor among several. Id at *23-24. Shortly afterwards, the
Daily Business Review reported that the Florida Justice Association, a statewide
advocacy group for plaintiffs' attorneys, is urging that Florida "go back" to Frye. Julie
Kay, Panel Urges Going Back to Frye Standard for Expert Testimony, DAILY Bus. REV.,
Oct. 20, 2015, at Al. As of mid-November 2015, the Florida Bar seemed to be divided on
the issue. Compare Wayne Hogan, Daubert-A Burdensome Solution in Search of a
Problem, FLA. B. NEWS, Nov. 15, 2015, at 10 with David A. Jones, Frye v. Daubert-
Time to Bring Florida Into the 21st Century, FLA. B. NEWS, Nov. 15, 2015, at 10. But in
December 2015, the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar Association voted to approve
the bar committee's recommendation that Florida continue to use Frye. FLORIDA BAR
BOARD OF GovERNoRs, REGULAR MINUTES 8 (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/0E799A22 IF4FB5B385
257F4D0077044A/$FILE/Regular/o2OMinutes,%2ODecember%204,%202015%20meeti
ng.pdf.
76. Why "apparently"?-because it might be thought that the Daubert Court's
rhetoric about FED. R. EvtD. 702's being more flexible and hospitable to the admission of
expert testimony than Frye was just that, mere rhetoric, and that the Court's real agenda
was to tighten the standards of admissibility so as to keep out "junk science." And it's
true that the Court didn't interpret FED. R. EviD. 702 in the most liberal way it might have
done, as requiring only relevance, and only the barest of relevance at that; but took it to
require, not only more than bare relevance but, in addition, reliability. All the same, so far
as I can tell, the Court's observations to the effect that FED. R. EVID. 702 was more liberal
than Frye were not just a rhetorical smoke-screen.
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and some conclusion, decision, etc. That the probability that a match
between the defendant's DNA and DNA from the crime scene is random
is one in a million, for example, is relevant to whether the defendant is
the perpetrator; that many published studies concluded that there is no
evidence that Bendectin is teratogenic77 is relevant to whether the drug
can cause birth defects, or caused this plaintiff's child's birth defects
specifically-as is the fact that some of those studies didn't distinguish
women who took the drug in the period of pregnancy during which the
fetal limbs were forming from women who took it later in their
78pregnancies.
In the terminology of my foundherentist theory of the determinants
of the quality of evidence and the degree of warrant of a claim,
79
relevance can be understood by reference to the idea of the
supportiveness of evidence with respect to a claim. Evidence is positive
with respect to C if, to some degree, it supports C, i.e., makes it more
likely that C is true; it is negative with respect to C if, to some degree, it
undermines C, i.e., supports not-C; 80 and it is neutral with respect to C if
it is neither positive nor negative, i.e., makes it neither more, nor less,
likely that C is true. Evidence is positively relevant to C if it supports C;
negatively relevant if it supports not-C; and irrelevant if it is neither
positively nor negatively relevant, i.e., is neutral with respect to C. (This
analysis diverges from McCormick's understanding of relevance in two
ways: it accommodates both dimensions of relevance, the negative as
well as the positive-which is surely a step forward; and, no doubt more
controversially, it avoids any identification of degrees of relevance with
mathematical probabilities, whether conceived objectively, either as
relative frequencies or as propensities, or subjectively, as degrees of
belief.).81
Unlike relevance, reliability is not a relation, but a property-a
property most commonly attributed to procedures, methods, processes,
informants, "sources," tools, employees, or friends, but sometimes also
77. As, of course, Merrell Dow pointed out in Daubert (and probably all the other
Bendectin cases). See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1314 (1995)
("Daubert II").
78. See, e.g., Blum, 33 Phila. Cnty. Rep. at 214-17 (reporting the testimony of Dr.
Shapiro).
79. See SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY (2d ed. 2009) (1993); SUSAN HAACK,
Legal Probabilism: An Epistemological Dissent, EVIDENCE MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF,
AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 122 (2014), translated in ESTANDARES DE PRUEBA Y PREUBA
CIENTiFpCA: ENSAYOS DE EPISTEMOLOGiA JURIDICA 65-98 (2013).
80. So in this context I'm using "supportiveness" in a technical, generic sense, to
include the negative as well as the positive, the undermining as well as the supporting.
81. See generally HAACK, Legal Probabilism, supra note 79.
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used in a slightly oblique sense (as "healthy" is sometimes used of a diet,
an exercise regime, or the climate in a certain location) of testimony or a
conclusion. A reliable watch or clock is one you can count on to keep
time; a reliable car is one you can count on to run well and not break
down; a reliable friend is one you can count on to show up when you
have arranged to meet, and to provide the help he promised; a reliable
plane schedule is one you can count on to tell you when your flight will
leave and when it will arrive at its destination; a reliable recipe or a
reliable method is one you can count on to give a good result; and a
reliable witness is one you can count on both to tell you the truth as he
believes it to be, and to know what he's talking about.8 2 In short, the
reliable is the trustworthy-the source, friend, tool, etc. you can count
on.
But what about reliability as it applies to testimony, statements,
claims-which is what's most centrally at issue here? The text of
Daubert suggests that reliable testimony is testimony arrived at by a
reliable method; specifically, that reliable expert testimony is testimony
arrived at by "scientific" methodology. Justice Blackmun's footnote 9,
however, takes a different approach: reliable expert testimony is
testimony based on a principle that, as he says, really supports what it
purports to.83 This conforms more closely to what seems to be the natural
way to think of reliability as it applies to claims, etc.: a reliable claim is a
well-founded claim, a claim which is (in my foundherentist terminology)
independently secure. This is a property of the testimony or the claim, a
matter of how well-established it is.8
4
Both Thayer and McCormick sometimes speak of "logical"
relevancy;8 5 but both implicitly acknowledge that whether and, if so, to
what degree, this claim or that alleged fact is relevant to a question at
issue usually depends on facts about the world. Thayer writes that in
82. W.K. Clifford, The Ethics of Belief, THE ETHICS OF BELIEF AND OTHER ESSAYS 70,
77 (Leslie Stephen & Sir Frederick Pollock eds. 1947); see also, Susan Haack, The
Expert Witness: Lessons from the US. Experience, 28 HUMANA MENTE: J. PHIL. STUD. 39
(2015); Susan Haack, Credulity and Circumspection: Epistemological Character and the
Ethics of Belief PROC. AM. CATH. PHIL. ASS'N (2014).
83. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) ("Daubert I").
(Of course, Justice Blackmun isn't using "supports" in the technical sense I have given
it.).
84. That is, how secure it is, independent of whatever support it may be given by the
conclusion it is adduced to support (which is why I call this the "independent security"
condition).
85. "[Unless excluded by some rule or principle of law, all that is logically probative
is admissible." THAYER, supra note 5, at 265. "[I]f evidence is logically probative it
should be received unless there is some distinct ground for refusing to hear it."
McCoRMICK, supra note 6, at 314.
2016]
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
determining relevancy the law relies on "logic and general
experience";86 discussing whether the defendant's having made a suicide
attempt is relevant to his consciousness of guilt, McCormick observes
that we have no statistics to tell us how much this raises the probability
that he guilty.
8 7
In fact, relevance is rarely a matter of pure logic. Why, for example,
is the fact that this character witness is his brother relevant to how
credible his testimony is that the defendant wouldn't hurt a fly? Because,
by and large, brothers can be expected to have a good opinion of each
other's character, and perhaps to be motivated to fudge a bit, if need be,
to help each other out. Why is the fact that this forensic technician was
disciplined for turning in his paperwork late relevant to how credible his
testimony is that the substance seized was cocaine? Because, in his haste
to complete his paperwork on time, he may have been sloppy about
double-checking the sample numbers. Why is the fact that mice exposed
to this substance develop cataracts relevant to whether exposure to the
defendant's cleaning fluid caused the plaintiff to do the same? Because
mice are physiologically similar to human beings, and the substance to
which they were exposed is the main ingredient in the product. Why is
the fact that this study was conducted by the manufacturer of the drug
88
relevant to whether its conclusions are likely true? Because we have
86. THAYER, supra note 5, at 265 (emphasis added).
87. McCoRMICK, supra note 6, at 318-19 (emphasis added).
88. For example, many of the studies of Bendectin referred to earlier were conducted
by Merrell Dow, or funded by Merrell Dow; and several were published in Teratology,
which was edited by medical scientist Robert Brent, a passionate advocate for the drug
who was for many years on retainer with Merrell Dow. As of 1996 (the date of Judge
Bernstein's devastating summary of flaws in the defendant's expert testimony in Blum,
33 Phila. Cnty. Rep. at 230), there were twelve animal studies of Bendectin, and forty
epidemiological studies. JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTiN ON TRIAL, 66-70 (1998). Five of
the animal studies (Hendrickx 1982, Hendrickx 1983, Hendrickx 1985(a) Hendrickx
1985(b), and Tyl 1988), and four of the epidemiological studies (Smithells 1983,
Michaelis 1983, Shiono 1989, and Erikson 1991) were published in Teratology. Id. at
253-275. Five of the animal studies (Gibson 1968, Gibson 1975(a), Gibson 1975(b),
Hendrickx 1985, and the second version of Tyl 1988), and six of the epidemiological
studies (Bunde and Bowles 1963, Milkovich 1976, Shapiro 1977, Smithells 1978,
Mitchell 1981, and Mitchell 1983) were conducted by Merrell Dow staff or funded at
least in part by Merrell Dow. Id. at 64-65, 69, 97-98, 262, 274. There is also evidence
that some co-authors of various of these studies had connections with Merrell Dow. (Not
surprisingly, many of these authors and co-authors testified for Merrell Dow in one or
more of the Bendectin cases.) A full exploration would, of course, require a whole other
paper. But see generally Haack, supra note 71, at 178-79; Susan Haack, What's Wrong
with Litigation-Driven Science? 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1053 (2008), reprinted in
EVIDENCE MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 180 (2014).
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reason to believe that studies conducted by manufacturers are more likely
to reach conclusions favorable to their products.89 And so on.
Reliability, too, usually depends on facts about the world. Why are
epidemiological studies calling on subjects' own reports of their diseases
and disorders highly unreliable? Because people's self-diagnoses are
often wrong.90 Why is this recipe for kheema9' not perfectly reliable?
Because the texture of the resulting dish depends on how juicy the
tomatoes are, as well as on how much stock you add. Why is the
testimony of a color-blind eye-witness that the car that caused the
accident was red unreliable? Because the commonest form of color-
blindness is an inability to distinguish red from green. And so forth.
Evidence may be relevant to a given issue, but not reliable; or
reliable, but not relevant to the issue. Imagine, for example, that X is on
trial for the rape of Y. A jail-house informant's testimony that X
confessed to the crime is highly relevant, all right, but very unreliable;
92
a DNA expert's testimony that Y is a descendant of Thomas Jefferson
may be highly reliable,93 but is unlikely to be even remotely relevant to
the case. Or imagine that X is suing Y for a disorder allegedly caused by
his taking Y's drug. Epidemiological evidence showing that exposure to
this drug is associated with a three-fold increase in the risk of developing
89. See, e.g., Richard A. Davidson, Sources of Funding and Outcome of Clinical
Trials, I J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 155 (1986); Lisa A. Bero et al., The Publication of
Sponsored Symposiums in Medical Journals, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1135 (1992); Paula
A. Rochon et al., A Study of Manufacturer-Supported Trials of Non-Steroidal Anti-
Inflammatory Drugs in the Treatment of Arthritis, 154.2 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 157
(1994); Lee S. Friedman & Elihu D. Richter, Relationship between Conflicts of Interest
and Research Results, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 51 (2004).
90. The only study that showed an increased risk of connective-tissue disorders
among women with silicone breast implants, the Hennekens study, was apparently based
on the women's own reports. Charles H. Hennekens et al., Self-Reported Breast Implants
and Connective Tissue Disease in Female Health Professionals: A Retrospective Cohort
Study, 275.8 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 616 (1996).
91. JOSEPH COTTA, A HERITAGE OF INDIAN COoKING 54-55 (1980).
92. "In all, there have been 111 death row exonerations since capital punishment was
resumed in the 1970s. The snitch cases account for 45.9% of those. That makes snitches
the leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases--followed by erroneous
eyewitness identification testimony in 25.2% of the cases, false confessions in 14.4%,
and false or misleading scientific evidence in 9.9%." Center on Wrongful Convictions,
The Snitch System: How Snitch Testimony Sent Randy Steidl and Other Innocent
Americans to Death Row (Winter 2004-2005), http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-
wrongful-conviction/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf; Informants, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/informants (last visited
Oct. 27, 2015).
93. DNA evidence indicates that some male of the Jefferson family was the father of
one of the children of his house-slave Sally Hemings. WILLIAM G. HYLAND, IN DEFENSE
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE SALLY HEMINGS SEX SCANDAL (2009).
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this disorder is very relevant, all right; but if the study had no controls,
wasn't randomized or double-blinded, relied on the subjects' own reports
of their disorders, or, etc., not very reliable. On the other hand, evidence
from an impeccably well-designed and well-conducted epidemiological
study that this drug triples the risk of an entirely different disorder is
likely much more reliable, but probably not relevant, or only marginally
SO.
My analysis confirms this: evidence may be relevant to a claim but
not reliable, i.e., while it supports, or undermines, the claim in question,
it lacks justification itself; or reliable but not relevant, i.e., while it is
solid enough in itself, it has no bearing either way on the likely truth of
that claim.
Most to the present purpose, as such familiar locutions as "highly
relevant," "very relevant," "remotely relevant," "marginally relevant,"
etc., indicate, relevance is normally a matter of degree, depending on
how closely this fact, that evidence, etc., bears on the matter at hand.
That the defendant was found standing over the victim's body holding
the murder weapon, for example, is highly relevant to whether he is the
perpetrator of the crime; that one of the dozen scientists who conducted
the rabbit tests on a drug had been sleeping poorly since his recent
divorce, if it is relevant at all to whether the drug is toxic to humans, is
only marginally so.
And, as such familiar locutions as "perfectly reliable," "highly
reliable," "very reliable," "fairly reliable," "somewhat unreliable," "not
very reliable," etc., indicate, reliability, like relevance, is also a matter of
degree. My watch is reasonably reliable, keeping time more than
adequately for my day-to-day purposes; but it has been known to gain a
minute or two, and isn't what I'd use if my life depended on my being
exactly on time. This recipe for kheema is very reliable, but not perfectly
so-when the tomatoes you use are exceptionally large and juicy, you
should add less stock than it says. This publication is usually a reliable
source with respect to the various r6gimes governing the admissibility of
expert testimony across the U.S., but not entirely so, since in 2014 the
account in the text was inconsistent with the information given in one of
the notes.94 That website is nothing but unreliable, self-serving hype.
Epidemiological studies calling on subjects' own reports of the disorders
they suffer are less reliable than studies that require medical diagnoses;
double-blind, controlled, randomized clinical trials are the most reliable,
94. DEMosTHENEs LoRANDos & TERENCE CAMPBELL, CROSS EXAMINING EXPERTS IN
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES §1:16:1 (2014). According to their notes 5 and 6, thirty-six
states are now "Daubert or Daubert-leaning," and twelve continue to use Frye; but in the
text the authors seem to have miscounted!
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the "gold standard" of epidemiology. The testimony of this eye-witness,
who has perfect vision, is more reliable than the testimony of that eye-
witness, who is short-sighted and color-blind. DNA-identification
techniques are more reliable than fingerprint-identification techniques.
And so on.
This, too, is confirmed by my epistemological analysis, which is
gradational through and through. Evidence is more relevant to conclusion
C, the more it tends to support, or to undermine, C: highly relevant if it
supports C (or supports not-C) to a high degree, marginally relevant if it
gives only very modest support to C (or to not-C). And it is more reliable
the more secure it is.
3. INTERPRETIVE DISAGREEMENTS
Even before Daubert, some courts were (understandably) confused
about the relation between relevance and reliability. For example, in
Downing Judge Becker had hinted that reliability might be something
like a degree of relevance, writing that "'[h]elpfulness' necessarily
implies a quantum of reliability beyond that required to meet a standard
of bare logical relevance." 95 And the year before Daubert, an appeals
court in Texas had written that "before novel scientific evidence may be
admitted under [Texas] Rule 702, the proponent must persuade the trial
court, by clear and convincing evidence, that the evidence is reliable and
therefore relevant. 9 6 But I want to focus here on the most consequential
conceptual complication-the gradational character of both relevance
and reliability, and the resulting mismatch with the categorical concept
of admissibility-and how this plays out in legal decisions applying the
new evidentiary r6gime for expert testimony put in place by Daubert.
Evidence E may be highly relevant to claim C, or somewhat relevant,
or only marginally relevant; and it may be highly reliable, fairly reliable,
or quite shaky. But an expert's testimony must be ruled either
admissible, or else inadmissible. 97 Briefly and roughly: if the degree of
95. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235 (1985).
96. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (emphasis added).
The Texas Rules of Evidence closely mirrored the FRE. (This observation, though
awkwardly put, raises a real question, which, however, I shall have to set aside here:
should we count as actually relevant testimony that would be relevant if it were well-
founded, even if it is known to be highly unreliable?)
97. A point first made in print, so far as I know, by Dale Nance in Two Concepts of
Reliability. Dale Nance, Two Concepts of Reliability, AM. PHHL. ASS'N NEWS. PaL. & L.,
Fall 2003, at 123. (However, as his title indicates, Nance was writing only of reliability.)
It is worthy of note that, proposing that England and Wales adopt a Daubert-style rule for
expert testimony, the Law Commission inadvertently highlighted the mismatch when it
urged that such testimony should be admissible only if it is "sufficiently reliable." Law
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relevance and reliability required is minimal, Daubert gatekeeping will
be, as Justice Blackmun apparently anticipated, flexible and
accommodating; but the higher the degree of relevance or reliability is
required, the less flexible and accommodating it will be, and the likelier
it is that decisions about the admissibility of expert testimony will shade
into determinations of its sufficiency.
The year after Daubert, in In re Paoli Railroad Yard,98 we find Judge
Becker wrestling with precisely these interpretive issues. He begins by
asking how high a threshold of reliability is required by Daubert;99 and
argues that, while the standard must be something more than a prima
facie showing, l°° it should not be so high that the proponent of the
evidence is in effect asked to prove his case twice, first at the
admissibility stage, and then again at trial:' 01
[The reliability prong of Daubert] does not mean that plaintiffs
have to prove their case twice-they do not have to demonstrate
to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the
assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to
demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions
are reliable.'0 2
He continues:
The grounds for the expert's opinion merely have to be good,
they do not have to be perfect. The judge might think that there
are good grounds for an expert's conclusion even if the judge
thinks that there are better grounds for some alternative
conclusion...103
Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales, (Law
Comm. No. 325, 2011) (emphasis added). (It is almost, but perhaps not quite, too obvious
to need saying that adding "sufficiently" provides exactly nothing by way of substantive
guidance.) The government subsequently declined to accept the Law Commission's
proposal. Ministry of Justice, The Government's Response to the Law Commission
Report, "Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales," (Law Com.
No. 325) (2013); In re Paoli R.R. Yard Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (1994).
98. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 717.
99. Id. at 743.
100. Id.
101. Id at 744.
102. Id (emphasis in original).
103. Id.
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The reliability requirement, he writes, "must not be used as a tool by
which the court excludes all questionably reliable evidence."'
' 04
Similarly, he continues, for relevancy: the standard is higher than "bare"
relevance, but not very high. 10 5 In short:
[T]he primary limitation on the judge's admissibility
determinations is that the judge should not exclude evidence
simply because he or she thinks that there is a flaw in the
expert's investigative process which renders the expert's
conclusions incorrect. The judge should only exclude the
evidence if the flaw is large enough that the expert lacks "good
grounds" for his or her conclusions. 1
06
But in some other post-Daubert cases we encounter much more
stringent interpretations both of relevance and of reliability than Judge
Becker envisages. Indeed, a significantly higher degree of relevance
seems to be required in Judge Kozinski's final ruling in Daubert on
remand from the Supreme Court; 10 7 and a significantly higher degree of
reliability seems to be suggested, only a couple of years later, in the
Supreme Court's ruling in Joiner. 1
08
i. Relevance and Sufficiency: The Legacy ofDaubert II.
Judge Kozinski's final ruling in Daubert is a rhetorical tour deforce;
it is also, however, more than a little confusing (not to say more than a
little confused). For example, pointing out that the plaintiffs' experts'
work on Bendectin had all been conducted specifically for the purposes
of litigation, Judge Kozinski proposes what is sometimes referred to as a
fifth Daubert factor-whether the science is litigation-driven-to add to
the Supreme Court's flexible list of indicia of evidentiary reliability.
10 9
But when he rules that the Dauberts' experts' testimony would have to be
excluded under the new Daubert r6gime, as it had previously been under
Frye, he doesn't rely on this new Daubert factor, but argues that the
testimony of all but one of these experts is inadmissible on grounds of
irrelevance;"10 and when he finds that the only expert whose testimony
104. Id. (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. 916 F.2d 829, 857 (1990)).
105. Id. at 745.
106. Id. at 746.
107. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (1995) ("Daubert II").
108. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
109. Daubert 11, 43 F.3d at 1317; see also Haack, What's Wrong with Litigation-
Driven Science?, supra note 88.
110. Daubertl, 43 F.3d. at 1320-21.
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would satisfy the "fit" requirement, Dr. Palmer, flunks the reliability
requirement, it is on the grounds, not that his work is litigation-driven,
but that he "offers no tested or testable theory" to explain how he was
able to rule out other possible causes of Jason Daubert's birth defects."'
On the question of reliability, Judge Kozinski apparently agrees with
Judge Becker; at any rate, he observes that the fact that scientific work
has been scrutinized through the peer-review process shows that it at
least meets "minimal" scientific standards." 2 But what concerns me here
is Judge Kozinski's interpretation of the relevance requirement. The
Supreme Court's reference to "fit," he argues, indicates that something
more is required than "bare" (i.e., presumably, marginal or remote)
relevance. 13 And what is that something more? Well, he writes,
"California tort law requires plaintiffs to show . . that Bendectin ...
more likely than not caused their injuries," and:
In terms of statistical proof, this means that plaintiffs must
establish not just that their mothers' ingestion of Bendectin
increased somewhat the likelihood of birth defects, but that it
more than doubled it-only then can it be said that Bendectin is
more likely than not the source of their injury. 114
But "none of plaintiffs'. . .experts [except Dr. Palmer] claims that
ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy more than doubles the risk of
birth defects";' 15 and so they flunk the second prong of Daubert, which
"goes primarily to relevancy." ' 1 6 This extraordinary argument (a) equates
degrees of proof with statistical probabilities; (b) assesses each expert's
testimony individually; and (c), most to the present purpose, raises the
standard of admissibility under the relevance prong to the standard of
proof
As I have argued elsewhere, degrees of proof are best construed as
degrees of warrant of the proposition at issue by the evidence presented;
and these degrees of warrant can't be identified with statistical
probabilities. 17 You can't infer, from the statistical probability that the
risk of developing disorder D among those exposed to substance S is
more than double the risk among those not so exposed, to the conclusion
111. Id. at 1319, 1321-22.
112. Id. at 1318.
113. Id. at 1321 & n.17.
114. Id. at 1320
115. Id. at 1320-21.
116. Daubert 11, 43 F.3d at 1321 & n.17 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) ("Daubert ").
117. See HAACK, Legal Probabilism, supra note 79, at 56-64.
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that it is more epistemologically likely than not that this plaintiff's D was
caused by his exposure to S' 8 -- any more than you can infer, from the
statistical probability that the match between DNA from the crime scene
and DNA from the defendant is random is one in a million, to the
conclusion that the epistemic likelihood that the defendant is not guilty
is, also, a one in a million." 9
Moreover, as I have also argued elsewhere, a piece of evidence that,
by itself, seems only marginally relevant to a conclusion may, in the
context of other evidence, turn out to be highly relevant-but may be
excluded by a too-atomistic screening process.' 20 "A brick is not a wall,"
Dean McCormick famously observed; 12 1 but Judge Kozinski's atomistic
approach could exclude the bricks a party needs to build its wall simply
on the grounds that they are just bricks!
But it's the third aspect of Judge Kozinski's argument that's most to
the present purpose. In effect, what he's asking is that each plaintiff's
expert produce evidence which (assuming it reliable) would be sufficient
to reach the standard of proof. As Prof. Imwinkelried would observe
shortly after Daubert I1, with this argument Judge Kozinski "breathed
new life"'122 into the relevance prong-new life that seemed to elide
admissibility into sufficiency.
Appeal to the idea of more than doubled relative risk [RR > 2]
wasn't new: Judge Kozinski cited DeLuca v. Merrell Dow (1990);123 well
before DeLuca the idea had played a role in some vaccine cases;124 and
in 1994 it had been endorsed in the first edition of the new Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence, where the authors of the chapter on
epidemiology wrote that "[t]he threshold for concluding that an agent
was more likely the cause of a disease than not is a relative risk greater
118. SUSAN HAACK, Risky Business: Statistical Proof of Specific Causation, EVIDENCE
MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 264 (2014).
119. See William C. Thompson & E. L. Schuman, Interpretation of Statistical
Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's
Fallacy, 11 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 167 (1987).
120. See Susan Haack, Proving Causation: The Weight of Combined Evidence, 4 J.
HEALTH & MED. L. 253 (2008), reprinted in EVIDENCE MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND
TRTH IN THE LAW 208 (2014).
121. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 317.
122. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Second Prong of the Daubert Test: Disturbing
Implications of Two Recent Civil Cases, 33 CRiM. L. BULL. 570, 572 (1997).
123. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3rd Cir. 1990).
124. Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Manko v. United
States, 636 F. Supp. 1419 (W.D. Mo. 1986). The story is told in some detail in HAACK,
Risky Business: Statistical Proof of Individual Causation, supra note 118, at 269-74.
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than 2.0.,,125 What was new was the idea that, in toxic-tort cases, this set
the standard for admissibility under Daubert-an idea that soon began to
spread as many other courts cited Judge Kozinski's argument and
adopted the same lofty standard of relevance in their admissibility
decisions: for example, Ambrosisi v. Upjohn (1995);126 Sanderson v.
International Flavors and Fragrances (1996);127 Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare (1996);12' Schudel v. G.E (1997);129 Bartley v. Euclid
(1998);130 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation (1998);' 31 In re Breast
Implant Litigation (1998);132 and Allison v. McGahn (1999).133
The second edition of the Reference Manual, published in 2000,
included a new chapter on epidemiology, under a new lead author; but
the section on the RR > 2 idea is much like the one in the first edition-
only now including a number of citations to some of the cases mentioned
125. Linda A. Bailey, Leon Gordis & Michael D. Green, Reference Guide on
Epidemiology, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 123, 168 (Federal Judicial
Center, 1st ed. 1994).
126. See, e.g., Ambrosini v. Upjohn Co., [1996 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 14,462, 47,144 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 1995) (ruling that Dr. Strom's testimony was
inadmissible because he wasn't able to say that a mother's having taken Depo-Provera
more than doubled the risk of birth defects in her baby). This decision, however, was
overturned the next year, the appeals court ruling that Dr. Strom's testimony
"comfortably cleared the hurdle of admissibility established by Daubert." Ambrosini v.
LaBarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 140 (D.D.C. 1996).
127. Sanderson v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1000 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (ruling that none of Ms. Sanderson's experts were admissible because they weren't
able to testify that exposure to the defendants' products more than doubled her risk of
developing chemical sensitivities).
128. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1398, 1403 (D. Or. 1996)
(finding that "[i]n epidemiological terms, Oregon's standard of proof means that
plaintiffs must be able to show a relative risk of greater than 2.0"; and "[u]nder this
substantive standard, if an expert cannot state the causal connection in terms of
probability or certainty, [their] testimony must be excluded under the [relevance] prong
of Rule 702").
129. Schudel v. Gen. Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopting Judge
Kozinski's statistical gloss on "preponderance of the evidence").
130. Bartley v. Euclid, 158 F.3d 261, 273 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[alssuming, without
deciding, that Havner's rule controls..."), vacated by 169 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1999). See
Havner, infra note 144 and accompanying text.
131. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., No. CY091-3015-AAM, 1998 WL
775340, at *8 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 1998) (accepting Judge Kozinski's statistical
interpretation of the standard for allowing the jury to hear plaintiffs' causation evidence),
rev'd, 292 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002).
132. In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Colo. 1998) (finding that, for
their evidence of medical causation to be relevant, plaintiffs must show a more than
doubled risk).
133. Allison v. McGahn Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (citing FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 168-69 (1st ed. 1994).
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here. 134 Naturally, federal courts continued to follow Judge Kozinski's
lead: in In re Silicone Gel Implants Products (2004), 131 for example, and
Henricksen v. Conoco Phillips (2009). 136 The chapter on epidemiology in
the third edition of the Reference Manual, published in 2011, finally
acknowledged that the equation of the preponderance standard with a
showing of RR > 2 required a number of caveats. 137 But courts haven't
always paid attention to these (much-needed) notes of caution.
In Samaan v. St. Joseph Hospital (2012),138 for example, affirming
the trial court's exclusion of Dr. Tikoo's testimony that, had the plaintiff
been given a timely injection of t-PA, 39 he likely would not have
suffered stroke-related injuries, the court of appeals argues that this
testimony doesn't reach the required standard of relevance because it
fails to show that, had he been given the injection, Mr. Samaan would
have had a greater than 50% chance of the better outcome. 140 It is simply
taken for granted that the relevancy prong requires a showing of RR > 2,
and that this is equivalent to the preponderance standard. And in a
California case, Cooper v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals (2015), 141 ruling that
the trial court had abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of the
Coopers' expert urologic oncologist, the court of appeals avers, citing
Daubert II and the second edition of the Reference Manual, that the
expert's testimony did meet the relevancy standard-it established that
134. Michael D. Green, D. Michal Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on
Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 384 (Federal
Judicial Center, 2d ed. 2000).
135. In re Silicone Gel Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 318 F. Supp. 2d 879, 893 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (averring that "under California law [statistical] analyses must show a relative
risk greater than 2.0 to be 'useful' to the jury").
136. Henricksen v. Conoco Phillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1158 (E.D. Wash.
2009) (excluding the plaintiff's expert testimony on the grounds that in the Ninth Circuit
an epidemiological study can be probative of specific causation "only if [it] shows the
relative risk is greater than 2.0").
137. Michael D. Green, D. Michal Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on
Epidemiology, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 612-18 (3d ed. 2011). 1
notice that these caveats bear quite a close resemblance to some points I had made in
Risky Business. HAACK, supra note 118, at 285-290, which in 2011 was in press, and
circulating, but not yet published.
138. Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp., 670 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012).
139. Tissue Plasminogen Activator for Acute Ischemic Stroke, which improves the
outcome for some stroke patients if administered within three hours of the onset of stroke
symptoms. Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp., 755 F. Supp. 2d 236, 239 (D. Me. 2010).
140. Samaan, 670 F.3d at 33.
141. Cooper v. Takeda Pharm. Am., Inc., 239 Cal. App. 4th 555 (2015) rev'g
Coordination Proceeding Spec. Title (Rule 2.550) Actos Prod. Liab. Cases, No. CGC-12-
518535, 2013 WL 1846220 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2015).
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Takeda's diabetes drug Actos was more likely than not the cause of Mr.
Cooper's bladder cancer.
142
Judge Kozinski's understanding of the relevancy requirement of
Daubert also made its way into state courts. For example, it seemed to be
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Texas in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals v. Havner (1997),143 and by the Supreme Court of
Vermont in Estate of George (2010). 144
But other courts, and some dissenting judges, took a different line.
Some (rightly) resisted the equation of statistical probabilities with
degrees of proof: for example, the courts in Jones v. Owens-Corning
(1996); 14 Pick v. American Medical Systems (1997); 146 McDaniel v. CSX
Transportation (1997); 147 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v.
Atterbury (1998);148 and the court of appeals that overturned the earlier
ruling in In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation (2002). 149 More to the
present purpose, the court in Pick, noting that FRE 401 defines relevant
evidence as evidence having "'any tendency' to prove or disprove a fact
of consequence in the case," argued that a showing of more than doubled
risk is not required for epidemiological evidence to be admissible. 150
And, most to the present purpose, in a passage reminiscent of Judge
Becker's argument in Paoli, Vermont Chief Justice Reiber observed in
his dissent in Estate of George that to impose a requirement that, to be
even admissible, epidemiological evidence must show a more than
doubled relative risk, "sets a threshold that requires each study to prove
that claimant[s] should win on the merits"; 151 and objects that this is
142. Cooper, supra note 141, at 593-94.
143. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717 (Tex. 1997) (averring
that "there is a rational basis for relating the requirement that there be more than a
'doubling of the risk' to our... evidence standard of review and to the more likely than
not burden of proof').
144. Estate of George v. Vermont League of Cities and Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 375 (Vt.
2010) (finding that the trial court had not erred in taking a relative risk greater than 2 as a
benchmark for admissibility of plaintiff's experts, given that this "easily tied into
Vermont's 'more likely than not' civil standard").
145. Jones v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 672 A.2d 230, 234-35 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1996) (rejecting the more-than-doubled-risk threshold).
146. Pick v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1160 (E.D. La. 1997).
147. McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Tenn. 1997) (rejecting the
idea that the more-than-doubled-risk test be adopted as a matter of law).
148. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183, 198 (Tex. App.
1998) (finding that there is no requirement of a showing of more than doubled risk in
toxic tort cases).
149. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding that the lower court had erred in requiring a showing of more than doubled risk).
150. Pick, 958 F. Supp. at 1160.
151. Estate of George, 993 A.2d at 387 (Reiber, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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inconsistent with the accepted principle that "admitted evidence does not
alone have to meet the proponent's burden of proof on a particular
issue."15
2
ii. Reliability and Sufficiency: The Legacy ofJoiner.
One could hardly describe Chief Justice Rehnquist's ruling for the
Supreme Court in Joiner,153 like Judge Kozinski's final ruling in
Daubert, as a rhetorical tour deforce. But, like Judge Kozinski's, Justice
Rehnquist's ruling pushes admissibility closer to sufficiency-this time,
however, not by raising the degree of relevance, but by potentially
raising the degree of reliability required. Justice Rehnquist doesn't,
however, do this explicitly: rather, it's the result of his strategically
sidestepping some key issues.
The Supreme Court took Joiner, the second case in its "Daubert
trilogy," to settle the question of the standard of appellate review for
evidentiary decisions under Daubert. The district court had excluded Mr.
Joiner's proffered expert testimony that his occupational exposure to
PCBs [polychlorinated biphenyls] had promoted his early development
of small-cell lung cancer, and-given that, with Joiner's experts
excluded, there was no case to answer-granted summary judgment to
General Electric [G.E.]. The court of appeals reversed, arguing that,
since FRE 702 displays a preference for admissibility, in cases such as
this courts should apply a "particularly stringent standard of review."
154
At the Supreme Court, G.E.'s attorneys argued that this amounted to a
new, and improper, standard of review; Mr. Joiner's attorneys replied
that, on the contrary, it had simply applied the regular "abuse of
discretion" standard with the level of rigor necessary in such instances.'55
Sidestepping this argument, Justice Rehnquist wrote on behalf of the
Supreme Court that Daubert hadn't changed the standard of review of
evidentiary exclusions, which remained the same: abuse of discretion.1
56
Moreover, he continued, in this instance the trial court had not abused its
discretion in excluding Joiner's experts.
157
However, Mr. Joiner's attorneys had also argued that their experts
used the very same "weight of evidence" methodology as the experts for
the defendant, G.E.; so that, given Daubert's insistence that the focus of
152. Id.
153. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
154. Id. at 140 (citing Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529 (11 th Cir. 1996)).
155. Id. at 141.
156. Idat 142.
157. Id. at 146-47.
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a reliability inquiry should be on an expert's methodology, not his
conclusions, legally it had been an error to exclude their experts while
admitting G.E.'s. But Justice Rehnquist sidesteps this argument too, first
announcing that there is, after all, no real distinction between
methodology and conclusions,158 and then urging that what courts should
ask in making reliability determinations isn't whether the expert used
proper methodology, but whether there is "too great an analytical gap
between [his] data and the opinion proffered." 159 He points out that
"nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data
only by the ipse dixit of the expert."'160 Granted. However, he tells us
nothing about what, exactly, an "analytical gap" is, or how a court is to
determine how large a gap is too large for expert evidence to be
admissible. If the conclusion rests on nothing but the expert's say-so, it's
inadmissible, yes; but when, short of that, is there an "analytical gap" too
large to be acceptable?
Thus far, I have presented Joiner as suggesting a stronger
interpretation of reliability. However, an "analytical gap" is presumably
a lacuna between data and a conclusion-which, being a relation, looks
more like relevance than reliability; so it seems as if Joiner is also
blurring the distinction between the two distinct requirements, reliability
and relevance, that the Daubert Court found implicit in the "helpfulness"
clause of Rule 702. Still, the "analytical gap" terminology is explicitly
offered as articulating reliability; and this, with the extension of the
scope of judicial gatekeeping from experts' methodology to their
conclusions, increased the likelihood that a higher degree of reliability
might be required than before; and so, like the ruling in Daubert II, more
likely that admissibility might shift closer to sufficiency.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Kumho Tire,16 two years later,
arguably represents another incremental step in the same direction.
Daubert applies, the Kumho Court ruled, to all expert testimony, not just
158. Id. at 146. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his partial dissent, it is doubtful
whether this element in the ruling in Joiner can really be reconciled with Daubert, in
which the distinction between methodology and conclusions played a starring role. Id. at
152 (Stevens, J. dissenting in part); see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d
717, 741-52 (3rd Cir. 1994).
159. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. The "analytical gap" terminology wasn't new; it is found,
for example, in Turpin, where the court writes: "The analytical gap between the evidence
presented and the inferences to be drawn on the ultimate issue of human birth defects is
too wide. Under such circumstances, a jury should not be asked to speculate on the issue
of causation." Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (6th Cir.
1992).
160. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
161. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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the scientific; but those Daubert factors-indicia of reliability crafted for
a case where the expert testimony at issue was epidemiological,
toxicological, etc.-may not be appropriate where other, non-scientific
kinds of expertise are concerned. 162 And the language of the 2000
revision of FRE 702, requiring inter alia that expert testimony be based
on "sufficient" facts or data, 63 may also have played some role.
Naturally, the "analytical gap" terminology soon began to be heard
in decisions on exclusions under Daubert. In Wills v. Amerada Hess
Corp. (2002), for example, affirming the district court's exclusion of
plaintiffs expert Dr. Bidanset, the court writes that this expert witness
"is using a controversial theory that some toxins do not follow the dose-
response relationship, but that any amount of exposure causes cancer."''
64
And "[e]ven though benzene and PAHs [polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons] have been shown to cause some types of cancer, it is too
difficult a leap to allow testimony that says any amount of exposure to
these toxins caused squamous cell carcinoma of the head and neck in the
Decedent."' 65 Two years later, in Burleson v. Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, affirming the district court's exclusion of the plaintiff s
expert testimony, citing the "analytical gap" language of Joiner, and
describing the expert's proffered testimony as based on "speculation,
guesswork, and conjecture," the court concludes that this was, indeed,
nothing more than the expert's ipse dixit.166 The same goes for Knight v.
Kirby Inland Marine (2005), where, affirming the exclusion of the
plaintiffs expert testimony, and screening each expert's testimony one
by one, the court cites the "ipse dixit" sentence of Joiner and observes
that it "can, and does, 'conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." 6
7
162. Id. at 150.
163. FRE 702 now reads (after the 2011 "restyling"): a qualified witness "may testify
in the form of an opinion or otherwise if (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis
added).
164. Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 98 CIV. 7126(RPP), 2002 WL 140542, at * 15
(S.D.NY. Jan.31, 2002).
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. Burleson v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 587 (5th Cir. 2004). It
is worth observing that here the difficulties in understanding what an analytical gap is are
compounded by the difficulties involved in determining when, exactly, what an expert
offers is nothing more than his ipse dixit.
167. Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine, 363 F. Supp. 2d 859, 867 (N.D. Miss. 2005).
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The "analytical gap" language of Joiner also migrated to some Frye
states. In Blackwell v. Wyeth (2009),168 for example, a Maryland case
where it was alleged that a vaccine caused a child's autism, we read,
"Generally accepted methodology .. .must be coupled with generally
accepted analysis in order to avoid the pitfalls of an 'analytical gap.' Dr.
Geier's faulty extrapolation from VAERS [Vaccine Adverse Effect
Reporting System] data, a potentially reliable source, manifests the ipse
dixit identified in the Joiner opinion."' 169 And Justice Battaglia notes
cases from two other Frye states where the "analytical gap" terminology
had also been used: Goeb v. Tharaldson (Minnesota, 2000),170 and Kane
v. Motorola, Inc. (Illinois, 2002). 171
Professors Green and Sanders claim that, especially since Joiner put
the emphasis on analytical gaps, there has been a trend towards courts'
taking reliability to require that the challenged evidence be sufficient to
meet the standard of proof.172 The evidence they offer falls well short of
showing this; but what is true is that at least a few courts seem to have
gone part of the way, and some, arguably, all the way, towards equating
reliability and sufficiency.
I start with Glastetter v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals (2000). 17' A
mother who suffered an intracerebral hemorrhage [ICH] after taking the
anti-lactation drug Parlodel sued the manufacturer, alleging that the drug
was the cause. Novartis moved to exclude the plaintiff's expert testimony
and for summary judgment. The district court's ruling granting both
motions begins with a discussion of the standards for summary
judgment, noting specifically that "[t]he trial court may not consider the
credibility of the witnesses or weigh the evidence"; 174 and continues with
a statement of the Daubert-Joiner-Kumho Tire standard of
admissibility. 175 And then Judge Webber deploys quite a subtle
argument: that, while differential diagnosis is a legitimate scientific
method, it can only yield conclusions about specific causation, not about
general causation; so that the plaintiff's experts can rely on it to establish
that Parlodel caused Mrs. Glastetter's ICH only if there are already
168. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235 (Md. 2009).
169. Id. at 255.
170. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 816 (Minn. 2000).
171. Kane v. Motorola, Inc., 779 N.E.2d 302, 309 (I1. 2002).
172. Michael D. Green & Joseph Sanders, Admissibility Versus Sufficiency:
Controlling the Quality of Scientific Testimony in the United States, UNCERTAIN
CAUSATION IN TORT LAW 203 (Miquel Martin-Casals & Diego M. Papayannis eds., 2016).
173. Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
174. Id. at 1017 (citing White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 779 (8th Cir.1992)).
175. Id. at 1018.
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grounds for believing that the drug can cause such injuries176 -these
experts' differential diagnoses ruling out other possible causes of her
injury can't show that Parlodel must have been the cause unless the drug
has already been ruled in, i.e. shown to be a possible cause.
But, Judge Webber continues, plaintiffs have failed to establish this
general causation claim. "[T]he case reports, including the re-
challenge/de-challenge studies, are not sufficient to establish the
reliability of plaintiff's experts' causation opinions";177 "[o]verall, Dr.
Kulig's testimony as to causation of vasospasm by Parlodel in humans is
inconclusive";178 "the court does not find that... sources [referred to by
plaintiffs' experts] establish the reliability of [their] testimony on
whether Parlodel could cause the ICH at issue in this case";' 79 the fact
that the FDA [Food and Drug Administration] had warned that the risk
that bromocriptine mesylate (the active ingredient in Parlodel) may cause
a serious adverse effect is unacceptable "do[es] not establish that
Parlodel caused Mrs. Glastetter's ICH";180 allegedly hidden company
documents related to their animal studies 'fail to establish the reliability
of plaintiffs' experts' conclusions.' 181 Shifting up and back between
"plaintiff's experts fail to establish the reliability of the proposition that
Parlodel can cause ICH" and "plaintiffs experts fail to establish the
proposition that Parlodel can cause ICH," Judge Webber seems to
assume that no item of expert testimony is admissible unless it is, by
itself, sufficient to establish a disputed fact.
The argument of Glastetter is atomistic; but in some other cases
where the line between reliability and sufficiency is blurred the reasoning
is, on the contrary, holistic-so holistic that it requires plaintiffs trying to
show that their own testimony meets the reliability requirement to show
what's wrong with the defendants' contrary expert testimony. In In re
Phenylpropanolamine [PPA] Products Liability (2003),182 for example-
multi-district litigation alleging that PPA, widely used in over-the-
counter and prescription cough and cold medicine and appetite
suppressants, caused hemorrhagic and ischemic stroke in men and
women, adults and children, as well as seizures, psychoses, and cardiac
176. Id. at 1027 (citing Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1413 (D.
Or. 1996)).
177. Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 1032 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 1033 (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 1035 (emphasis added). In this context the court observes that the FDA is
using a lower standard than tort law. Id. at 1036.
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230
(W.D. Wash. 2003).
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and other injuries-defendants moved to exclude plaintiffs' expert
testimony under FRE 702 and Daubert. Denying this motion in part
(with respect to plaintiffs expert testimony regarding strokes), and
granting it in part (with respect to their testimony regarding other
disorders and any injuries occurring more than three days after exposure
to PPA), Judge Rothstein cites Judge Kozinski's strictures about
litigation-driven science 1 3 and the "analytical gap" terminology of
Joiner.184 She tells us that she "reviewed pleadings filed in support of
and in opposition to the motion, along with the remainder of the record,
and ... heard oral argument and expert testimony. ,,185 In short, she
conducted a thorough scrutiny of the evidence and arguments of both
parties. As a result, while with respect to the part of the defendants'
motion that she denies Judge Rothstein acknowledges the distinction
between admissibility and weight,'8 6 the ruling as a whole seems to bring
the two closer together.
A more recent example is In re Zoloft (2014),187 multi-district
litigation alleging that, when taken during pregnancy, this anti-
depression medication caused birth defects. Here too the defendant
company moved to exclude plaintiffs' expert testimony. Granting the
motion in part (with respect to testimony that Zoloft could cause birth
defects), but denying it in part (with respect to testimony that there is a
plausible biological mechanism by which it could alter embryonic
development), 88 Judge Rufe argues that reliable testimony about human
causation should generally be supported by epidemiological studies, and
that "when epidemiological studies are equivocal or inconsistent with a
causation opinion, experts asserting causation opinions must thoroughly
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the epidemiological research
and explain why [it] does not contradict or undermine their opinion."'189
Like Judge Rothstein in In re PPA, with respect to the part of the
plaintiffs' expert testimony he deems admissible, Judge Rufe
acknowledges the difference between admissibility and sufficiency;
190
but, when it comes to the part of their testimony he deems inadmissible,
his argument seems to be that, in light of the defendant's epidemiological
evidence, the plaintiffs' expert testimony is insufficient.
183. dat 1238.
184. Id.
185. Id at 1234.
186. Id. at 1240.
187. In re Zoloft Prods. Liab. Litig., 26 F. Supp. 3d 466 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
188. Id. at 481-82.
189. Id at 475 (emphasis added).
190. Id at 481.
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Perhaps the clearest example is a silicone breast-implant case, Norris
v. Baxter Healthcare,'9 1 two years after In re PPA. The district court had
concluded that the plaintiff's experts' methodology couldn't be
scientifically valid because it ignored the many epidemiological studies
that found no link between silicone breast implants and systemic disease.
Affirming on appeal, observing that he can't find a single case in which
differential diagnosis flatly inconsistent with epidemiological results has
been deemed admissible, and citing Joiner's "analytical gap"
terminology, Judge McKay writes that "[w]e cannot allow the jury to
speculate based on an expert's opinion which relies only on clinical
experience in the absence of showing a consistent, statistically significant
association between breast implants and systemic disease." 92 He
dutifully lists the Daubert factors, 193 and suggests that the plaintiffs
experts flunk at least two (peer review and publication, widespread
acceptance);' 94 but, as Professors Green and Sanders observe, this looks
like window-dressing: 195 the core idea is that the plaintiffs expert
testimony is inadmissible because, given the epidemiological studies
offered by the defendant, it is insufficient.
But, again, as with relevance, other courts, and other judges, have
taken a different line. I will focus on Kuhn v. Wyeth (2012),196 where the
plaintiffs alleged that their short-term use of Wyeth's hormone-
replacement drug Prempro had caused their breast cancer, the defendants
moved to have the plaintiffs' expert testimony excluded under FRE 702
and Daubert, and the magistrate judge to whom this evidentiary matter
was referred granted their motion, leading to summary judgment for
Wyeth.
197
On appeal, however, Judge Wollman reverses this Daubert decision.
He endorses Judge Becker's observation in Paoli: "[t]he standard for
judging the evidentiary reliability of expert evidence is 'lower than the
merits standard of correctness."' 1 98 He continues: "[p]roponents of expert
testimony need not demonstrate that the assessments of their experts are
correct, and trial courts are not empowered 'to determine which of
191. Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2005).
192. Id. at 887.
193. Id. at 884.
194. Id. at 886.
195. Green & Sanders, supra note 172, at 226.
196. Kuhn v. Wyeth, Inc., 686 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2012).
197. Id.at 620-621.0
198. Id.at 625 (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3rd Cir.
1994)).
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several competing scientific theories has the best provenance.""1 99 And
he cites the Advisory Committee's Notes on the 2000 revision of FRE
702: "When a trial court... rules that an expert's testimony is reliable,
this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is
unreliable." 200 That, he writes (citing Justice Blackmun's observations in
Daubert), is a matter to be sorted out by the finder of fact after cross-
examination and presentation of contrary witnesses.
20 1
Judge Wollman cites the "analytical gap" language of Joiner;20 2 but
tells us firmly that:
Plaintiffs, as the proponents of Dr. Austin's testimony, however,
do not necessarily have a burden to disprove the WHI [Women's
Health Initiative] study's finding that short-term use of Prempro
does not increase the risk of breast cancer. Instead, it is their
burden to show that Dr. Austin arrived at his contrary opinion in
a scientifically sound and methodological fashion.
20 3
And he continues in the same vein with respect to the other studies
Dr. Austin considered, again emphasizing the importance of the
distinction between admissibility and weight.20 4 True, toward the end of
his ruling Judge Wollman writes that Dr. Austin's testimony is
admissible "because the studies on which he relied were sufficient to
support his opinion . .";205 but this obviously doesn't show that he is
conducting a sufficiency analysis to determine whether Dr. Austin's
testimony is admissible. On the contrary, he insists that while "[tihere
may be several studies supporting Wyeth's contrary position," it is
simply "not the province of the court to choose between the competing
theories when both are supported by reliable scientific evidence."206 As
the italicized phrase reveals, he assumes-as the Advisory Committee
had said unmistakably clearly-that, in the sense explained in Daubert,
there may be reliable evidence both for the plaintiffs theory, and for the
defendant's competing explanation.
199. Kuhn, 686 F.3d at 625 (citing Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., 639 F.3d
11, 15 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d
77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998)).
200. Kuhn, 686 F.3d at 625 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 625 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993)
("Daubert I")).
202. Id.
203. d.at 626.
204. d.at 628-32.
205. d.at 632.
206. Kuhn v. Wyeth, Inc., 686 F.3d 618, 633 (8th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
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So there's yet another irony in Daubert. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in this landmark case to resolve disagreement across the federal
courts about the status of Frye after the adoption of FRE 702; but, as we
have seen, the conceptual fault line in Daubert has led to further
disagreement, a new source of discord.
4. NORMATIVE PUZZLES
The main themes thus far have been descriptive and conceptual: that
the contrast between the avowed intentions of the Daubert Court, and the
consequences of its ruling-between its professed preference for
admissibility and its more-restrictive results-is, in significant part, the
consequence of the potential for slippage in those central concepts,
relevance and reliability. But of course this leaves a tangle of normative
questions unanswered. Are those more-stringent interpretations of
relevance and reliability to be welcomed, or should they be resisted-
and, in either case, on what grounds?
Opinions differ. A year after Daubert, summarizing some early
decisions under the new evidentiary regime, Thomas J. Mack puzzled
over how scientific testimony that was ruled admissible under Daubert
could fail to be sufficient. Justice Blackmun's ruling, he suggested: "...
carries the seemingly contradictory assumption that scientific testimony
can be admissible as relevant and reliably grounded in scientifically valid
reasoning and methodology and also be so "shaky" that it is insufficient
to establish what it asserts." 207 This, he continued, could be read as an
"inappropriate conflation" of admissibility and weight. 208
Though he didn't articulate it specifically, Mack's argument already
hinted at the problem that Prof. Imwinkelried would highlight a few
years later, after Daubert 11209 and Hall:21 ° that scientific testimony might
be deemed inadmissible unless it is sufficient: ". . . Daubert II and Hall
are arguably authority that to be of enough assistance to be admissible
under Federal Rule 702, standing alone purported scientific testimony
must possess sufficient probative value to prove the fact in issue." 2 1
And, like Mack, Imwinkelried writes of the danger of a "conflation" of
admissibility with sufficiency: "The reasoning of those courts about the
second prong in the Daubert test is debatable and disturbing. In their
207. Thomas J. Mack, Scientific Testimony after Daubert: Some Early Returns from
Lower Courts, 30 TRIAL 23, 30 (August 1994).
208. Id.
209. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1314 (1995) ("Daubert II").
210. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
211. Imwinkelried, supra note 122, at 575.
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exegesis of the helpfulness prong, the courts seemed to conflate
admissibility and sufficiency analysis. 212
Unlike Mack, however, who thought that Daubert "[might] not lead
to much substantive change in the outcome of cases that turn on
scientific testimony," 213 Imwinkelried feared that enforcement of the
principle that scientific testimony is admissible only if it is sufficient
would "deal a tremendous blow to prosecutors," who could find
themselves unable to introduce helpful but insufficient forensic
testimony.214 Perhaps needless to say, neither Mack's prediction nor
Imwinkelried's has been borne out. Daubert has had an effect; but this
effect has been felt much more in civil cases than in criminal,2" notably
in making it harder for plaintiffs in toxic tort cases to get their expert
testimony admitted-perhaps because defendant companies in such cases
have the resources to mount serious Daubert challenges, as parties now
routinely do.216
More recently, Green and Sanders have taken a very different tack,
defending some courts' elision of admissibility into sufficiency as a
desirable development. Their main concern, they say, is simply to
describe how the Daubert inquiry has evolved in toxic-tort litigation; but,
they add, "normatively we applaud this reconceptualization of what
Daubert is about .... ." Why so? All they say explicitly is that this "will
provide greater coherency and illumination to the process of deciding
which cases should be submitted to a jury and which should not";217 but
their sub-title, "Controlling the Quality of Expert Witness Testimony in
the United States," conveys the impression that they think this will
encourage better expert testimony.
I wish the normative issues here were nearly as simple as they
apparently seem, one way or the other, to these commentators. Sadly,
they're not. Still, the suggestions and arguments we've been examining
raise three kinds of issues worth exploring: first, about the interpretation
of Daubert, etc.; second, about the underlying epistemological issues;
and third, about matters of judicial economy, policy, and the like.
212. Id. at 583.
213. Mack, supra note 207, at 23.
214. Imwinkelried, supra note 122, at 580.
215. See generally Peter Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal
Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH S107 (2005).
216. Green & Sanders, supra note 172, at 203.
217. Michael D. Green & Joseph Sanders, Admissibility versus Sufficiency:
Controlling the Quality of Expert Witness Testimony in the United States (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). This sentence has apparently been suppressed in the
published (2016) version of their paper.
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The first issue is raised by Mack's and Imwinkelried's talk of
"conflation" or "confusion" of admissibility with sufficiency: is a more
modest interpretation of relevance and reliability, or a more ambitious
one, more faithful to FRE 702, to the Daubert trilogy, and to the
underlying legal considerations? Here, I believe, the answer is clear: the
modest understanding articulated by Judge Becker in Paoli and seconded
by Judge Wollman in Kuhn is entirely consonant with the Daubert
Court's observations about the "austerity" of the Frye Rule, the
"preference for admissibility" articulated in the FRE, and the role of
cross-examination and presentation of contrary evidence in exposing
"shaky but admissible" expert testimony; and, of course, with the
traditional distinction between admissibility and weight. More stringent
interpretations, though they exploit a real elasticity in the key concepts in
Daubert, look like-well, like a stretch. Moreover-even though, as we
have seen, they include elements that may have encouraged more
ambitious understandings-there is nothing in Joiner or Kumho Tire that
requires the stronger interpretation; indeed, even in Joiner we read that
"the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat
broader range of scientific testimony than would have been admissible
under Frye.,218 And, as we have also seen, the Advisory Committee's
Notes on the 2000 revision of FRE 702 call unambiguously for a modest
reading.
219
But even if the more modest interpretation is more faithful to
Daubert, etc., mightn't the more ambitious one have better
consequences? Couldn't the unintended consequences of that fault line in
Daubert be benign, even desirable? Well, I reply, certainly the
unintended consequences of legal changes can be adaptive. But nothing
follows about whether a more modest interpretation of relevance and
reliability or, as Green and Sanders suggest, a more ambitious one,
would result in less uncertainty and more predictability in decisions on
the admissibility of expert testimony-much less about whether a weaker
or a stronger interpretation would better control the quality of such
testimony.
The claim about coherence seems to be ambiguous-and mistaken
whichever way you take it. If the idea is that, if courts adopted more
stringent interpretations, we could expect to get more consistent
admissibility decisions in similar cases than we would if courts adopted
more modest interpretations, the reply is surely that we could expect
218. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
219. These Notes also make it abundantly clear that the reference in FRE to
"sufficient" data is just a verbal variant on "enough" data or "adequate" data, and should
not be taken as suggesting that reliability requires legal sufficiency.
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more consistent results either way, whether courts more consistently took
the more ambitious line, or more consistently took the more modest one.
And if, on the other hand, the idea is that there is a kind of incoherence in
supposing, as more modest interpretations must do, that both sides'
expert testimony might be, in Daubert's sense, reliable, the reply is that
this ignores that fact that, when the science concerned is as yet unsettled,
disagreements between equally-qualified, equally-serious, and equally-
honest experts may be entirely reasonable given the limitations of the
evidence available; it may be a matter of judgment what conclusion is
better-warranted.22 °
What about the idea that more stringent interpretations would help
ensure that parties produce better expert testimony? Discussing Judge
Wollman's adoption of the modest interpretation of reliability in Kuhn,
Green and Sanders suggest a quasi-epistemological argument: under
Daubert, courts are to look to whether an expert's testimony was arrived
at by the scientific method; and "Weight of Evidence Methodology,"
they continue--citing Prof. Cranor-is part of that method. 221 So,
presumably, the idea is that Judge Wollman should have deemed the
plaintiffs experts' testimony inadmissible because they hadn't taken
account of all the evidence; which would have required them to give a
satisfactory explanation of what was wrong with the defendants' contrary
evidence.
Unfortunately, Prof. Cranor's explanation of "weight of evidence
methodology" was, to say the least, confusing;223 and, in any case, I don't
220. This is not to say that this is subjective, simply a matter of taste; rather, it's to say
that it is something that depends on the whole complex mesh of an expert's background
beliefs, which naturally affects how much weight different experts give to this or that
evidence.
221. Green & Sanders, supra note 172, at 232 (citing CARL CRANOR, ToxIC TORTS:
SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE, 77-79, 136-39 (2006)).
222. Id.
223. Cranor writes of "inference to the best explanation," "diagnostic arguments,"
"diagnostic induction," "inductive arguments," and "differential diagnosis," apparently
treating all these as equivalent. He tells us that such inferences may be stronger or weaker
but not, like deductive inferences, valid or invalid. CARL CRANOR, Toxic TORTS:
SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE, 78 (2006). But he tells us very little
about what makes such an inference more or less strong. According to Prof. Cranor's
testimony in Milward, "weight of evidence methodology" (there apparently identified
with "inference to the best explanation") has the following six steps: identify an
association between exposure to substance S and the development of disorder D; consider
a range of plausible explanations; rank them in order of plausibility; seek more evidence;
consider all of the relevant available evidence; use your judgment to integrate it. Milward
v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., 639 F.3d 11, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2011). But without
substantial content given to the concepts of plausibility, relevance, and integration, this is
empty advice.
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believe there's any such "methodology. 224 Still, of course I agree that-
in science as elsewhere-more comprehensive evidence is
epistemologically better than less.22 5 But this thought, though true,
obviously doesn't answer the key questions presently at issue. Yes-
assuming for the sake of argument that judges do an OK job of
screening-making the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony
more demanding should improve the quality of the expert testimony
presented to juries. But this tells us nothing either way about whether, in
the long run and on the whole, the legal system is likelier to get better
expert testimony by having courts take a tougher approach to their
screening task at the admissibility stage, so that fact-finders never hear
what a judge deems inadequate, or by having judges take a more liberal
approach to the task of screening expert testimony and letting the
evidence be thrashed out at trial through cross-examination and the
presentation of contrary witnesses. Perhaps needless to say, I don't know
the answer to that question. Perhaps more importantly, I don't believe
anyone does.
To be sure, the closer admissibility is pushed towards sufficiency,
and so the more plaintiffs' expert testimony is found inadmissible, the
more summary judgments we can expect; which will certainly save
courts' time and energy. So, yes, more stringent interpretations would
result in a gairi in judicial economy. But not without cost: for one thing,
the standard of review for decisions on the admissibility of expert
testimony (abuse of discretion) is more deferential than the standard for
review of summary judgment decisions (de novo); so this might mean a
covert shift towards less rigorous review of summary judgment
decisions.226 Perhaps needless to say, I don't know whether, in the long
run and on the whole-even if it does mean that some deserving
plaintiffs will never have their cases heard, and perhaps that the potential
dangers of some drugs or chemicals will never be explored as they
ideally should be-this downside of tougher admissibility screening is
more than outweighed by its benefits in streamlining a badly-
overburdened tort system. I don't believe anyone knows the answer to
this question, either.
224. See HAACK, supra note 120, at 226-27 & 235-37.
225. Indeed, according to the theory I developed in Evidence and Inquiry,
comprehensiveness is one of the determinants of evidential quality. HAACK, EVIDENCE
AND INQUIRY, supra note 79, at 117-39.
226. Presumably recognizing this, Green and Sanders suggest that, on appeal,
decisions under the admissibility-as-sufficiency interpretation they favor be given a "hard
look" under the abuse of discretion standard. Green & Sanders, supra note 172, at 237-
38. This "concession" is, however-well, less than generous.
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It's not that my sympathies lie, in principle, more with plaintiffs than
with defendants. I don't doubt that plaintiffs' expert testimony in the
kinds of toxic-tort case we have been exploring is sometimes pitifully
weak-any more than I doubt that defendants' expert testimony is
sometimes very selective and misleading. No: my main concern is that
the tort system do a decent job both of its primary task, compensating
deserving plaintiffs but not the undeserving, and of its secondary task,
serving as backup to an inevitably fallible regulatory system by
providing incentives to get dangerous products off the market without
discouraging the production of useful and harmless ones. And that, I now
see, is why I find the elision of reliability into sufficiency disturbing. If
there's a defensible epistemological rationale for the adversarial system,
it is that the thrashing-out of evidence at trial enables us, often enough, to
reach factually sound verdicts.227 But the elision of admissibility into
sufficiency contributes to the growing tendency to pre-empt this
process228-when no one knows whether the benefits are worth the
cost.
2 29
227. See Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American
Way, 49 Am. J. JURiS. 43 (2004), reprinted in EVIDENCE MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND
TRUTH IN THE LAW 27 (2014); Susan Haack, Justice, Truth, and Proof: Not So Simple,
After All, presentation at the Cltedra de Cultura Juridica at the Universitat de Girona,
Spain (Jan. 1, 2015), forthcoming in Spanish translation in DEBATIENDO CON MICHELE
TARuFFO (Jordi Ferrer BeltrA & Carmen Vdzquez, eds.) (English version on file with
Author).
228. See Haack, Justice, Truth, and Proof, supra note 227 (English manuscript pages
20-24).
229. My thanks to Mark Migotti, for helpful comments on more than one draft; to
Erica Beecher-Monas and Stephen Calkins, for the helpful questions that prompted notes
96 and 76 respectively; to Joseph Sanders, for helpful correspondence; to Pamela Lucken
and A.J. Blechner, for help in locating relevant (and reliable!) material; to Vitor de Paula
Ramos, for teaching me that marvelous Portuguese idiom for "I have a problem"; and, of
course, to the Cohen family for their generosity in endowing this lecture series.
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